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Tsapelik.I. INTRODUCTION
The development  of a competitive  private sector  business  environment  in the industrial  sector, is
essential  to the sustainability  of Russia's growth.  Since  the start of reforms in 1992, significant  progress
has been made in many  areas of the economy. Russia's industrial  sector is one where price controls  have
been lifted on 90% of wholesale  and retail goods, and most state owned enterprises  (SOEs) have been
privatized,  although  some key SOEs  have  yet to be fully or partially  divested. 2
Yet Russia had not undertaken significant  restructuring  of dominant firms or eliminated  non-
economic  barriers to entry before price liberalization  or privatization  was instituted. Horizontal and
vertical dominance  among incumbent  furms,  and barriers to entry by new businesses  are considerably
more pronounced  in Russia's industrial  sector relative  to many other transition economies  (a significant
exception  being China 3). The relative  absence  of new businesses  in Russia is particularly  striking.  While
many enterprises have experienced ownership change, the  industrial configuration determined by
administrative  fiat and central  planning  during  the Soviet  era has yet to give way to a regime  of enterprise
structure,  conduct  and performance  engendered  by competitive  market forces.
It appears  that there remains  considerable  potential  for abuse of market  power in Russia,  not only
in the infrastructure  monopoly sectors--a point that is widely acknowledged  and for which policy
initiatives  form a significant  part of the Government's  structural  reform agenda--but  also in elements  of
the manufacturing  sector.  In point of fact, many industrial firms are effectively immune to robust
competitive  market forces due to structural  and administrative  impediments. These impediments  include
significant  seller (and buyer) concentration--horizontal  dominance--in  select regional markets; there is
also a high degree of vertical integration  and exclusive buyer-seller  relationships in certain industrial
sectors and pervasive  regional geographic  segmentation.  Equally important,  regulatory and institutional
entry barriers protect many incumbent firms in dominant markets from new competitors  or even the
threat of potential  competitors,  both domestic  and foreign. 4
Excessive  horizontal and vertical consolidation  and high entry barriers in Russia's industrial
sector have several consequences:  (i) high prices, reduced output and diminished product and service
quality--all  of which act as disincentives  for rechanneling enterprise assets to higher use values and
greater productivity;  (ii) diminished incentives  for inter-regional  trade among regions, thus retarding
formation  of a unified economic  space; (iii) reduced  business investment  from foreign sources;  and (iv)
stifled innovation  and technological  advancement.  Reforming anti-competitive  horizontal and vertical
structures  in the manufacturing  sector and reducing  barriers to entry for new competitors  should be key
items on Russian  post-privatization  agenda  for enterprise  reform.
This paper assesses the incentives and constraints on enhancing structural aspects of inter-
enterprise competition and  on  reducing barriers to  entry in  Russia's  manufacturing sector and
recommends  policies  for the Russian  authorities.  The centrat-conclusions  are that in an economy  as large
as Russia's that is undergoing  a complex  transition,  the appropriate  competitive  horizontal  and vertical
restructuring of  industrial markets needed to  strike a  balance between reducing anti-competitive
conditions  and allowing  for sufficient  economies  of scale can only be accomplished  in the medium  term.
But reducing  policy-induced  and institutional  barriers  to entry  of new private sector  competitors  can--and
should--be  implemented  in the short  run. Indeed,  even where excessive  horizontal  and vertical structural
dominance  remains, facilitating  free entry can help make such markets contestable  and provide strong
pressures to  compel competitive performance from incumbents. Equally important, a  rules-based
institutional  framework  for implementing  competition  policy--at  the federal and regional levels--must  beestablished to reduce administrative discretion and corruption, increase  transparency and predictability
and enhance incentives for accountability.
II. STRUCTURAL  DOMINANCE  AMONG INCUMBENT FIRMS
At the national level, the degree of concentration of industrial output in Russia suggests an
absence of a structural competitive  problem. The average 4-firm concentration  ratio (the sum of the
market shares  of the top four producers)  is about  60%. For many  industries,  Russia and the United States
have similar 4-firm  concentration  ratios, and the largest  Russian  manufacturing  enterprises  (measured  by
number  of employees)  are not unusually  large compared  to US firms. Indeed  what is noteworthy  is the
lack of small firms in Russia.'  However, this aggregate-level analysis masks three underlying attributes
of Russia's industrial landscape.
1. Horizontal Dominance
First,  large  Russian  enterprises  tend  to  be  configured  as  single  integrated  multi-plant
establishments, often located  in or near  a  single city. In contrast, in  industrialized  economies  a given
enterprise usually has multiple  establishments and they  are located across  domestic regions and often
abroad. In Russia, products as diverse as trolley buses, potato-harvesters, motor scooters, and coal-cutting
and tunneling machines--to mention only a few of hundreds--are manufactured only in a single enterprise
in the whole of the country.  On an establishment basis, the largest Russian enterprises are significantly
larger than their counterparts in other countries, including the United  States.  Reliance on conventional
measures of national market share and concentration thus likely understate the true extent of horizontal
dominance in many Russian markets. Data  on 328 firms in a  1997 World Bank-Russian Academy of
Science (WB-RAS) survey6 reveal that the average market share at the oblast level is 43%. Recent data
on concentration indicate that at the oblast level, the average 4-firm concentration ratio is above 95%.
In large part, the existing level of horizontal dominance in Russian  manufacturing markets is a
legacy of Soviet centralized planning. Horizontal  integration is also  increasing. But  less so through de
novo  expansion  than  through  mergers  and  acquisitions.  The  recently  announced  mergers  among
aluminum companies and the earlier proposed mergers of oil companies  are cases in point.  Horizontal
integration is also increasing through the creation of financial  industrial groups  (FIGs). The WB-RAS
survey found that enterprises with higher market shares are more likely to be registered as members of a
FIG; indeed, the average oblast market share of firms associated with a FIG was 53%, while the average
oblast market share for firms not associated with a FIG was 42%.
Surprisingly, empirical investigation of the effects of horizontal dominance on the performance
of Russian firms is exceptionally sparse. This is in contrast to the vast literature on this  issue for many
developed and developing countries, including transition economies. Arguably, this is due to the paucity
of comprehensive data on Russian firms in the short period since the onset of reform; and what data do
exist  suffer  from  the  fact  that  Russian  financial  accouniting practices  diverge  from  International
Accounting Standards. Rectifying  this data  vacuum and carrying  out systematic empirical  analysis of
such data should be seen as a major challenge to the Russian authorities if policy-making in this area is to
be strengthened.  In one of the few empirical studies that have been undertaken, support can be found for
the notion that, as in other countries, in Russia, the greater the level of market concentration the higher
are industry profits. 7 The same study found that capital intensity is negatively related  to profitability.
Data from the WB-RAS survey indicate that firms with lower capital productivity  are more likely to be
registered  as "dominant"  (generally  defined  as having  market  shares  above  35%--see below)  by  the
Ministry of Anti-Monopoly Policy and Support for Entrepreneurship (MAPSE). Worker productivity also
2appears to suffer from horizontal dominance. To take but one example, the  100,000  workers at the
automobile  firm GAZ, which is one of the more innovative  large-scale  businesses,  produced 220,417
vehicles  in 1997,  compared  to the 125,000  workers  at Chrysler  that made 2 million  cars. Goskomstat  data
of 800 enterprises  reveals that firm size is negatively correlated  with sales revenue per employee  (see
Appendix).
2. Vertical Integration
Second,  many  of the dominant  enterprises  in Russia are also highly  vertically integrated  (or have
exclusive buyer-seller relationships). Excessive  levels  of  vertical  integration superimposed on
(horizontally)  concentrated  product markets can foreclose  the entry of rival firms. The high degree of
observed vertical  integration  largely reflects inertia  of the uncertainties  and chronic shortages  of the old
Soviet  supply system.  Engines  for trucks are still made only by the Zavolzhye  engine factory  and bought
only by the GAZ vehicle factory. Heavy locomotives  are still produced only by the Novocherkassk
electrical  equipment  factory, and the output is purchased  completely  by the Railways  Ministry.  Vertical
integration  is also increasing,  occurring  usually  through mergers  and acquisitions  rather than through  de
novo expansion. In the oil industry Tyumen  Oil was created in 1995,  bringing together oil production
associations,  refinery operations,  and oil product  marketing  firms. Vertical integration  also is increasing
through the creation of industry-led  (as opposed to bank-led)  FIGs. A case in point is ALKOR, which
encompasses  aluminum  smelting,  production and distribution  of finished products. Data from the WB-
RAS survey  reveal  that 46% of the firms indicated  that their customers  purchased  supplies from only 1 or
2 suppliers,  and that 23% of the suppliers  control more  than 65% of the relevant  input market
To be sure, there are economies of scale and a savings in transactions costs in combining
successive  stages  of production  under one corporate  roof. The classic case of continuous  steel-casting  is
well-known: it would be economically inefficient (if not technologically  unfeasible) to have three
separate firms heating iron ore, rolling it into ingots, and then finishing  them into steel products.  But in
most industries such efficiencies exist only up to a point. Indeed, in the vast majority of markets
throughout  the world it is increasingly  cheaper for a firm to buy inputs (or sell outputs) on the open
market or through  arms-length  contracts rather than producing  them internally.  In Russia, it appears  that
due to the hazard of market transactions and because enforceable  contracts are still nascent, there are
strong incentives  for vertical integration.  As in the case of assessing the degree and implications  of
horizontal dominance,  empirical investigation  of vertical business linkages in Russian manufacturing
should  be a priority  for policy makers.
3.  Regional Market Segmentation
Third, significant  political economic  power is wielded by regional authorities in Russia. This
manifests  itself in the tight control of important  economic  activities within a region's boundaries. Such
control, in combination  with enterprise  vertical integration,  helps to freeze the high degree of structural
autarky engendered under  the  Soviet system, where  consumer goods  production was  a  local
responsibility and  enterprises served only their respective local markets.  Worse, it  strengthens
administrative--as  opposed to  economic--geographic  market boundaries, and  fosters the  regional
segmentation  of the Russian economy, diminishing the establishment of a  unified economic space,
vigorous  inter-regional  competition  and exploiting  natural economies  of scale.
There are a variety of practices  local authorities  exercise  to limit  the inter-regional  movement  of
goods and services. Tariffs are charged on the import or export of certain agricultural products in
Ulianovsk,  Belgorod,  Sverdlovsk  and Orlov oblasts, among  others. There also is an increasing  trend of
regional duties being collected  on the importation  of vodka and other alcoholic beverages.  Many of the
3same locales maintain regional-level  price controls on some agricultural  products.  Businesses using
migrant workers.  are often charged registration  fees -by local governments,  which add to the costs of
production  and inhibits labor  mobility. Regional  authorities  also grant special tax or credit preferences
to build local business champions.  Arbitrary licensing of one kind or another is also pervasive, and
provincial  authorities  often create local monopolies  by granting single licenses. Indeed examination  of
the wholesaling  system shows a continuation  of exclusive distribution  patterns that largely remain from
the central  planning  system:  privatized  wholesale  organizations  continue  to distribute  mainly to and from
the same customers  they served in the old days. In short, large  public monopolies  have been turned into
large  private monopolies  that are now working closely  with government. In this regard, it is telling that
in recent years some of the most frequent violations  that MAPSE has dealt with were abuse of market
dominance  and anti-competitive  actions  by local governments. 8
m.  BARRIERS TO NEW ENTRANTS
According  to official  estimates,  in 1997 seventy  percent of Russia's GDP came from the private
sector, up from less than 10% just  five years earlier at the start of reform. This is a remarkable
achievement.  But the  main source of the  expansion of  the Russian private sector remains the
privatization  process. The creation  of private de novo businesses in Russia is exceptionally  weak and
continues  to lag far behind the pace of other transition economies,  especially  in Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet  Union (EE/FSU).  The lack of effective entry by new private firms is a missing critical
ingredient  in Russia's enterprise  reform  program.
1. Who Are The New  Private Entrants in Russia?
A World Bank 1996  random survey of Russian firms of all ownership  categories  indicates  that
58% of de novo firms in the private sector are owned by managers, 26% are owned by individuals
("outsiders"),  and 6% are owned by workers.  The owner-manager  firm--mainly  small and medium size
enterprises  (SMEs)--appears  to be the dominant  form for private de novo Russian  enterprises.  SMEs were
virtually  eradicated  in Russia during the Soviet  period, more so than in any other EE/FSU country,  and
mushroomed  again only in the late 80s. While the SME sector grew very fast in the early years of
Russia's reform,  in the last few years growth  has slowed  dramatically,  and may even  have ceased.
There are 845,000  registered SMEs in Russia, generally  defined  as business  establishments  with
less than 250 employees  (of which "small" firms are defined  by law as establishments  with less than 100
employees). This is four times the number a decade ago.  Most SMEs operate in services,  trading and
public catering. SMEs employ about 13% of the Russian  labor force, and produce  about 12% of GDP;
however, these figures are likely to be inaccurate since much small business activity is still in the
informal  economy  and thus goes largely  unreported. Still the fact remains that in comparison  with other
countries in the region, Russia's SME growth has been severely limited. The percentage of national
employment  accounted  for by SMEs in the Czech Republic is 37%; in Georgia  58%, and in Macedonia
37%; SMEs account for 53% of US employment,  80% of Italy's employment,  and 69% of France's
employment.  Importantly,  the geographic  distribution of SMEs in Russia is highly skewed. Whereas
Moscow accounts for 22% of all SMEs, and St. Petersburg accounts for  10%, 28 subjects of the
Federation  each account for only about  0.5% of the total.
2.  Constraints  On New Entrants
Economists distinguish  between different types of structural entry barriers: those that are (i)
economic in nature, principally determined by technology or market forces, and those that are (ii)
4institutionally-determined  or administratively-induced.  The need for policy intervention to deal with
economic  barriers generally  arises only when such barriers are (a) chronically  high and (b) in markets
where there is already  significant  horizontal  or vertical dominance;  this is best decided on a case-by-case
basis.  For institutionally-determined  or administratively-induced  entry barriers, the case for policy
intervention  is more  clear-cut.
Economic  Barriers  to Entry
In certain  industries,  the technology  fundamental  to the production  process  naturally  gives  rise to
economies of  scale, where unit costs decline as output expands to  meet market demand; in such
industries  these scale economies  are a barrier to entry since it is unlikely  that multiple businesses  can all
attain the minimum  efficient scale to be commercially  viable. There are likely to be significant scale
economies  in certain segments  of the infrastructure  monopoly  sectors in Russia  (as elsewhere).  However,
in most of the manufacturing  sector, scale economies  are unlikely  to be as pronounced  relative  to market
demand and thus, absent policy-induced  constraints, such economic barriers to  entry are likely to
relatively  modest,  and some in cases, relatively low. This is true in Russia as it is worldwide. Product
differentiation  becomes an entry barrier when incumbent  firms enjoy brand loyalty among  consumers,
making it difficult for potential rivals to become commercially  viable because of the need to invest
heavily in  advertising and/or by charging significantly lower prices.  Like many other transition
countries,  to date brand loyalty among  Russian firms is not strong and product  differentiation  is unlikely
to be an entry barrier. The advantages  that come with the successful diffusion of innovation  can also
serve to prevent new entry.  Much depends on the embedded technological  prowess of firms and on
whether  there is a patent system in place that helps to protect and reinforce that prowess through the
granting of exclusive production  and marketing  rights. As in most transition economies, technological
innovation  is not a an impediment  to entry in Russian industry, and there does not exist an effective
patenting system. If anything, entrants displaying  technological  prowess have an easier time entering
Russian  markets.  Finally, there is the case where endowments  of natural resources  can act as an entry
barrier. During an industry's development,  firms that locate and exploit such deposits first will have a
strategic market advantage over those seeking entry later (unless or until new resource deposits are
discovered  or the initial firms decide to license otherwise  exclusive access rights). Norilsk Nickel is a
case in point.
Institutional  and Administrative  Barriers  to Entry
Evidence  from Russia suggests  that the principal institutionally  or administratively  determined
constraints  on entry  by the de novo private sector are: (i) discrimination  with regard  to business  licensing
and registration;  (ii) blocked access  to (state-owned)  warehousing  and distribution  channels;  (iii) a harsh
and uncertain regulatory regime (changing "rules of the game") with weak mechanisms  for dispute
resolution; (iv) difficulty in obtaining suitable business premises and real estate; (v) corruption and
organized  crime;  (vi) poor access to seed capital and competitively  priced bank credit; and (vii) a large
tax burden, including high rates, multiplicity  and complexity,  and lack of stability, predictability  and
transparency.  Many of these impediments  have been (and in some cases still are) present in other
transition  countries  in the region, including  the Czech Republic,  Hungary,  Poland  and Ukraine,  especially
in the early  stage of the transition  process.  Although  the empirical  evidence  of the impact  of such barriers
in Russia generally  comes from surveys,  there does not exist sufficient systematic  data to determine  the
relative importance  of each of these constraints;  carrying out an empirical investigation  to make this
determination  is critical for policy making.
Registration and Licenses.  Although the business license process varies among Russia's
regions,  the average new business applicant  must deal with 20-30 agencies and receive 50-90 approved
5registration  forms. There are 30 different kinds of licenses for a business start-up. In the WB-RAS
survey, 12%  of the firms indicated  that in the past year they had applied for a new license but had been
unsuccessful.  The survey  also found that firms  that are part of unregistered  FIGs are more likely to fail at
obtaining  a license than firms that are part of registered  FIGs. Thirty four percent of the surveyed  firms
indicated  they were forced to obtain a license that in their opinion was not legally required, and 13%
indicated  their enterprises  paid license fees in excess of what is legally  required. Against this backdrop,
it is not surprising  that the licensing process is fertile ground for corruption (see more below).  An
anecdote  that one entrepreneur  paid $7,000  equivalent  for a license,  of which only $800 equivalent  went
to government,  is not atypical. Firms that specialize helping new businesses  navigate the registration
process have become a new growth industry. On average to  start up a new business in Russia an
entrepreneur  must spend from 5,000  to several 100,000  New  Rubles.
Warehousing and Distribution Networks. While private entry has taken place in retail and
commercial  activities,  the state owned sector still plays a major role in distribution.  Moreover,  outside
the major 2-3 Russian cities, there are either very poor or non-existent warehousing facilities. The
situation is particularly  acute for refrigeration  facilities, placing severe handicaps on transshipment  of
perishable  products across regions.  The physical  condition  of inter-city  roads is significantly  poor, often
far below that found in other countries  in the region,  making long-haul  trucking an extremely  expensive
and difficult mode of transportation.  Railroad freight rates have traditionally been high in order to
subsidize  rail. passenger  traffic. Potential  entrants  in the distribution  and warehousing  sector  confront  not
only the usual licensing  and other policy-induced  start-up  difficulties  facing any new business  in Russia,
especially  entry barriers  posed by neighboring  local administrations,  but also must deal with organized
crime,  which is quite active  in this sector.
Corruption.  Surveys  indicate  that corruption  as a barrier to entry in Russia is pervasive;  virtually
all firms pay bribes to tax inspectors,  customs officers and a host of local bureaucrats. 9 Indeed cross-
country  evidence  suggests  that Russian SMEs operate in a business  environment  that may be worse  than
most transition economies. On average it takes four times as long to establish a  small enterprise in
Moscow than it does in Warsaw,  that Russian SMEs are subjected to twice as many yearly inspections
than their Polish counterparts,  and that the number  of regulatory  agencies involved  in SME development
in Russia  is half again as many  as there are in Poland.  A recent OECD  survey  reveals  that SME managers
in Russia are subject to manipulation by local authorities of  40 to 50 tax rates and deductions. But
official  taxes are not the only levies  new Russian  businesses  have  to pay. Many small  enterprises  have to
pay the mafia to survive. The local press is replete with stories of entrepreneurs  paying for a "roof'
(krysha)  for protection.  One story reported that mafia levies commonly  start from 5% of profits but are
often higher, and are usually collected as a flat monthly fee. There is also the threat of violent crime
against entrepreneurs:  in the WB-RAS survey, 16% of the General Directors indicated they are "very
worried"  about becoming  a victim  of violent  crime.
Capital Barriers to Entry.  In almost any country it is difficult to persuade banks or other
financial institutions to  back a  start-up business; in  transition economies, where  capital market
imperfections  are pronounced and institutions that internffediate  savings into investment capital are
typically nascent,  the problem is particularly  acute. Like many other countries in the region, in Russia
bank loans for new businesses-if  they are available at all-are  short-term,  typically  for 6 months term,
and expensive. As a  result, most SMEs are started from personal savings. According to the State
Committee  on Small Business, only 15% of small businesses in Russia in recent years have received
bank credits. Mortgages are not widely practiced  and there are only initial steps in leasing equipment.
The emergence of FIGs in Russia can be interpreted as a response to capital market imperfections;
6evidence  indicates  that firms that are members  of FIGs are less dependent  on internal funds to finance
investment  expenditures  than are unaffiliated  firms.'"
Dispute Resolution. In Russia (like other transition  economies),  contracts  are hard to verify  and
enforce. In a word, private property  rights are not secure or credible. The lack of efficient methods  to
resolve commercial  disputes substantially  increases  the cost of entry. Most business people in Russia
prefer to resolve differences among  themselves  rather than bring cases to court. Most importantly,  the
regulatory regime governing enforcement  of compensation  for successful plaintiffs collecting debts is
weak. This places the burden on the plaintiff  for debt collection,  where the mafia is often instrumental.
Up until recently,  plaintiffs have had to pay an advance  fee equivalent  to 10% of the suit; new rules set
the fee at 5%, with fees decreasing  as claim size increases. Overall,  the major issue is implementation
and enforcement  of the law.
Land and Real Estate. New startups are hindered  by restricted access  to commercial  real estate
due to monopoly ownership and control over urban land by municipal administrations.  In theory
enterprises  have  the right to privatize associated  land plots; in practice,  procedures  are unclear.  Less than
1%  of the land  under privatized  enterprises  has been privatized.  Firms cannot  realize the value of the land
via mortgage, lease, or sale, nor can they restructure effectively  by modifying structures since control
rights over land flow only from the ownership.  The failure to assign clear rights over unoccupied  and
undeveloped  urban land is another restriction.  Against the backdrop  of the state Duma failing to devise
legislatively  a comprehensive  Land Code that permits private ownership of land, the Government  has
pursued these objectives through presidential decrees. Implementation  of these decrees, however,
particularly  at the sub-federal  level has been  weak;  and the current land tax system contains  disincentives
on the part of local govermments  to sell land under privatized  non-land real estate.  More progress  has
been made for establishing  the legal framework  to ensure leasing and selling of commercial  real estate
belonging  to the federal government  takes place under competitive  conditions;  but such provisions  are
not mandatory  for regional and local govermnents.
Taxes.  Surveys  show that all businesses  in Russia  complain  about their tax burden, and that the
burden on  SMEs is  particularly harsh. Although the smallest enterprises benefit from some tax
concessions  (the size threshold  for such benefits varies across locales, and benefits often are subject to
negotiation and political connections; statutorily,  firms with fewer than 15 employees generally get
concessions),  most SMEs (above 100 employees)  have to pay a profit tax, which ranges from 35% to
38%, and the VAT of 10% to 20%. But it is the sheer number  of other taxes--ranging  from advertising
taxes  to computer  resale taxes--and  the time needed  to process  the required  paperwork  on a monthly  basis
that represent  a sizable operating  cost, thus threatening  the survival  of new entrants (see Appendix  for a
list of the other  taxes); taxes also change  frequently.  One tax consultant  to new businesses  notes that the
requisite tax report requires 30 statements  and the VAT instruction has changed 3 times in a 6 month
period.  That  taxes can be negotiated  (especially  at the local level), reduces  the stability,  predictability  and
transparency  of the tax regime.
IV.  POLICY  ASSESSMENT
1. Proactive Policies Towards Incumbents and New Entrants
As market  reforms continue,  and budget constraints  continue  to harden-ensuring that the prices
firms pay for inputs and charge for outputs are in cash, timely,  and free of all subsidies  (including  direct
budgetary subsidies and off-budget sources of support, such as permitting tax arrears and soft bank
7loans}-inefficient large incumbent  enterprises (particularly those still in the state sector) will likely
decline in importance.  11 But based on international  experience,  proactive polices are needed to both
foster the horizontal  and vertical restructuring  of such firms and redress the problem of regional market
segmentation.  The main components  of a proactive  program  are under the general rubric of competition
policy.  The portion of competition  policy that focuses on incumbents  includes de-monopolization  and
dis-integration  of dominant  firms; prohibiting  mergers  and acquisitions  that reduce the number  of sellers
and increase  structural dominance;  penalizing  for restrictive  business practices,  such as collusion,  price
fixing,  predatory  pricing  to drive out competitors  or deter entrants;  and protecting  consumers  from unfair
trade and false advertising  practices.  Worldwide,  effective  implementation  of such policies has proven to
be difficult  and the record  of success  is mixed. It is particularly  challenging  in a large, complex  economy
such as  Russia's. Even with  improvements in  Russia's  competition policy regime (see  below),
implementation  regarding  incumbents  will take time due to the significant  political economy  costs that
large restructurings  will entail.
Reducing  structural  barriers  to entry,  which can be done in the short-run,  is the other  main prong
of competition  policy.  New entrants increase pressure on privatized companies and remaining  SOEs.
Even when incumbent  firms have attained dominance,  facilitating entry (or allowing for the credible
threat of entry) can help instill competitive  performance,  especially in markets where sunk costs are
relatively  small  and thus exit can be effected  should  demand  soften.  Freeing  up entry can help make such
markets  contestable.  Entrants are a source of growth  through employment  creation,  not only due to new
business  development,  but also in providing  the absorption  capacity as restructured  firms shed labor and
other resources.  Entrants  have played such a role in many  transition economies. Poland provides strong
evidence  on this score.  Between 1992  and 1995  industrial  output in Poland increased  by 34%, and private
entrants accounted  for 2/3 of this increase.1 2 Evidence from the vast majority of transition economies
indicates  that new entrants engender  other benefits: they bring modern  techniques and entrepreneurship
skills; they utilize new plant and equipment; and they employ incentive structures that provide for
market-oriented  corporate governance practices. Reducing entry barriers through greater openness to
imports  and foreign  direct investment  (FDI) is especially  critical. Yet while liberalization  toward imports
and FDI can be the primary  tool of competition  policy in small open economies,  such as the Baltics, for
the larger  transition economies,  such as Russia, trade and FDI policy  reform must be coupled  with other
policies to enhance structural competition  within the domestic  market. Empirical evidence shows that
even in the tradable sectors this is true: without competitively  structured distribution networks, the
impact of import competition  is significantly  muted because distribution services are location-specific,
and thus trade and FDI become  segmented  by geography  and transportation  costs.
2.  Reform of Russia's Competition Policy Framework
Russia,  like many EEIFSU countries, has  modeled  its competition  statues  on  those  found in
industrialized market economies,  including the  EU and the US.  In addition,  Russia,  again  like most
EE/FSU  countries,  concentrates  its  efforts  to  encourage  new  entry  through  programs  that  provide
financial support for the development of SMEs; less attention is given to achieve this objective through
systematic policies to remove regulatory and institutional entry barriers.
Russian  Competition Policy  Toward Incumbent Firms.  Russia's  State  Anti-Monopoly
Committee  (GAK)  was founded in 1990; it was given  ministerial  status in 1995; it was transformed  into
MAPSE in late  1998 (subsuming the  GAK, the Committee on  Small Business and the previous
independent  regulatory bodies overseeing  transport and communications). Including its approximately
80 regional branches, the MAPSE is in charge of enforcing several anti-monopoly  statutes. A major
component of the MAPSE's program is the maintenance  of a register of "dominant" firms, where
8"dominance"  is generally  defined as at least a 35% market share. In its initial  years, the GAK classified
thousands of firms as dominant at the federal and regional levels, and regulated these firms' prices,
profits and output. The approach has been heavily criticized both inside Russia and by international
experts  because of its questionable  economic  rationale and unwieldy  procedures,  including its tenuous
method for defining  geographic  and product  market boundaries  and justifiable costs. In 1997 the federal
section of the GAK dominant firm registry included about 500 industrial enterprises, accounting  for
roughly 20% of all industrial output. At present, MAPSE oversight  of prices and profits of dominant
firms is less one of direct regulation  and more of preventing  anti-competitive  pricing--both  the charging
of prices above competitively  determined  levels and of predatory and entry-deterring  prices. However,
the problems  of a poorly clarified economic  rationale and unwieldy procedures  remain largely intact.
With regard  to mergers,  prior approval of the MAPSE is required for acquisitions  of more than 20% of
the shares of a company,  or acquisition  of shares in any firm included  in the register of dominant  firms.
Current  rules specify  two tiers of dominance:  proposed mergers  that result in 65% market share are per
se "undoubtedly  dominant";  for proposed  mergers  that result in market share between 35% and 65%, the
MAPSE  bears  the burden  of proof that the merger  would result  in a "dominant"  firm.
Surveys  suggest  that the MAPSE  generally  has been reluctant  to enforce  the law in clear cases of
market abuse.  In the WB-RAS  survey,  more  than 30% of the respondent  General  Directors  indicated  that
producers colluding to fix prices are not subject to sanctions under the anti-monopoly  law. Political
economy  constraints  and excessive  use of discretionary--as  opposed  to rules-based--authority  seem  to be
a major factor in preventing effective enforcement.  The decline in industrial output during Russia's
transition has made it difficult to take actions against important industrial enterprises.  Case evidence
reveals  that regional  MAPSE  branches  have had a tendency  to protect local champions  rather than act as
part of a  federal  anti-monopoly  system. At the same  time, many  observers  have concluded  that although
the MAPSE has an adequate statutory basis to be  effective, it lacks the resources, skill base and
information  to deal sufficiently  with prevailing  anti-competitive  problems. 13
Russia's  Promotional  Policies for  New Entrants.  The policy framework  for encouraging  entry
is focused on SMEs. Russian federal legislation  supporting  SME  development  dates back to 1993,  when
a Support  Fund for Entrepreneurs  was created that provided for short-term  credits. A two-year  holiday
on profit  taxes also was established. Subsequently,  regional and local support  funds  were created, and it
is at these levels that the bulk of SME support is implemented. In 1995 the State Committee  for the
Support  and Development  of Small  Businesses  was created  (and as noted above,  in 1998  it was subsumed
under MAPSE). The Committee  is charged  with coordinating  the allocation of support  to SMEs,  largely
in the form of low-interest  credits from Federal, regional and international  sources,  as well as technical
assistance from the latter. New laws also have been enacted to  foster the development of SMEs,
including  one in 1995 that defines  eligibility  limits on SME size ("small" enterprises  have no more than
100 employees), allows SMEs to pay only a single tax on income, and to take advantage  of other
incentives,  including  accelerated  amortization.  However,  licensing,  registration  and accounting  problems
at that the regional and local levels  have prevented most SMEs to avail themselves  of the law's benefits.
In 1997 a new federal small business support program was initiated for small ventures to grow to one
million, and the work force to expand  by 3 million  by 2000: Long-term  plans call for SME  contribution
to the economy  to double  to account  for 25% of GDP with the number  of workers  involved  to increase  to
25-30 million.
Principles for  Reforms  Competition policy in most transition countries has been similar to
Russia's experience.  It has focused more on deterring anti-competitive  conduct (through establishing
price controls), rather than dealing with imperfections in market structure. It is not surprising that
progress has  been  slow,  since establishing effective competition policy  involves considerable
9institutional  building  and the development  of specialized  skills. Countries  that have made more, but still
mixed,  progress  in implementing  competition  policy--largely  the industrialized  economies  such as the EU
and US--have  given  emphasis  to (i) actively  dismantling  excessive  horizontal  and vertical dominance;  (ii)
preventing  anti-competitive  mergers  through  the implementation  of clearly defined  and widely  publicized
merger guidelines; (iii) establishing credible, sizable criminal sanctions against collusion and price
fixing; and (iv) significantly  reducing policy-induced  impediments  to new entry. They also have (v)
rules-based  competition  policy agencies with effective implementation  authority, resources, and well-
trained staff.  14
With respect  to promotion  of SMEs, as a general rule there is no economic  rationale for policy to
favor a particular business  ownership  form or size. At a minimum,  a policy of neutrality  is called for.
This in itself would suggest a reorientation  of the policy regime to reduce the bias against SMEs and
eliminate  the regulatory  and institutional  barriers  to entry in the Russian  economy.  On the other hand, in
Russia (as in other transition  economies),  where  market failures  are pronounced,  SMEs generate,  perhaps
uniquely,  positive externalities  that can address these market failures. As noted earlier, by dint of their
size and their ability to  fill easily market niches, SMEs offer a  source of flexibility in business
development.  This is needed especially in the process of transition where experimentation  is critical.
Evidence  from other countries  suggests  that whereas  initially SMEs tend to occupy  the retail sector,  over
time SMEs have become significant  players in manufacturing.  Because SMEs represent employment
outlets  for a rational  downsizing  of the public sector  they add to stabilization.  Finally, growth  in the SME
sector is characterized  less in terms of expansion  of incumbent  firms (which is typical for growth  in the
large-firm  sector)  and more  in terms of de novo entry and the introduction  of new products  and processes.
It is on these grounds  that a regime  to financially  promote  SME development  can be justified.  However,
such a regime should have not only limited objectives  and be transitory, but it also should be seen as a
supplement to  policies that  eliminate regulatory and  institutional barriers to  entry. International
experience  is replete with examples  that small business  promotional  programs  often lead to the creation
of new bureaucracies  that survive  years beyond  their useful lives.
3. Policy Recommendations
Policies  Toward  Incumbents
Make Structurally  Dominant  Markets  Contestable  for New Entrants.  Despite  progress in recent
years, Russia still faces the challenge  of designing  a robust enforcement  regime  to deal with horizontal
and vertical structural market imperfections  among incumbent industrial firms. Rather than devoting
scarce economic  and political resources for direct regulatory  oversight  of day-to-day  pricing conduct of
"dominant"  firms in the manufacturing  sector,  the immediate  focus should be on eliminating  regulatory
and institutional  barriers to entry for new competitors  (specific actions are outlined below). In short,
creating contestable market conditions should be the first line of offense in compelling competitive
performnance,  not the creation of more elaborate  regulatory  pricing schemes.  MAPSE's "dominant"  firm
registry and related regulations on  profit margins and output should be  abandoned immediately.
Moreover,  in reducing  administrative  and institutional  barriers to entry, priority attention and resources
should be directed toward those markets where there is already significant  structural dominance;  other
markets  can be dealt with subsequently.  In addition, reduction  of entry barriers  must be focused  not only
on creating favorable conditions  for new competitors  domiciled within a regional market, but also on
creating such conditions so that potential competitors  based in other geographic markets can sell or
invest in the regional market in question. This is critical to neutralize the regional segmentation  of
markets.  It means that stronger enforcement  authority must be realized at the  federal level to deal with
the anti-competitive  practices  of local governments.
10Develop Comprehensive  Merger Guidelines.  Resources should also be directed at preventing
further horizontal and vertical consolidation through mergers and  acquisitions in  markets where
structural dominance  and autarky are already excessive. This should be the first of line of defense.
Initiatives here can build on MAPSE's current system regarding assessment of mergers. But more
explicit and well-defined  merger guidelines  should be developed and announced  that establish general
policy parameters  for distinguishing  between pro-competitive  and anti-competitive  mergers based on
similar guidelines  used in industrial  countries,  such as the EU and the US. The blanket application  across
all markets  of the current cutoffs of 35% and 65% has little economic  rationale;  refnements are needed
to take into account the underlying  technology  of the production  process, and product and geographic
market boundaries. Public announcement of the  guidelines is  critical to  maximize transparency,
credibility  and predictability  of the merger/acquisition  policy regime so as to not hinder a "market for
corporate  control"  and the rechanneling  of assets to higher  values in use. Merger  applicants  should  know
ex ante they have to meet the burden of proof that a merger  will enhance efficiency  and not result in a
significant  loss of competition. But a balance must be struck between, on the one hand, prohibiting
excessive  enterprise  integration  that engenders  the exercise of market power, and on the other,  fostering
sufficient  integration  that permits the realization  of technical  economies  of scale and scope. Big business
is not always bad. Where existing firms are below minimum  efficient scale, integration should not be
prevented but rather encouraged. Newly created integrated company structures that span otherwise
regionally  autarkic  markets,  including  perhaps as a transition  device newly established  industry-led  FIGs,
can help ameliorate  the existing artificial  market segmentation.
Develop  Rules-Based  Competition  Policy  Institutions.  Experience  in both Russia and elsewhere
shows  that when implemented  poorly, i.e., as a new source of discretionary  authority,  competition  policy
can do great harm. While Russian competition  law is, for the most part, up to par with international
standards,  the institutional  regime for its implementation  and enforcement  responsibilities  is extremely
weak and subject  to excessive  discretion,  especially  in light of the power and involvement  of sub-federal
governments  in promoting  regional industrial  policy. Several steps could be taken. The Government  at
the very highest levels should review the mission of the current MAPSE, with a  view towards
developing,  in consultation  with renowned international  experts,  recommendations  to introduce  a rules-
based competition  policy institutional regime at the federal and sub-federal level of government.  To
institutionally  strengthen  MAPSE,  the agency should  be twinned with competition  authorities  in OECD
countries  to carry out a series of sectoral  appraisals.  Consideration should also be given  to promoting  the
establishment  of a non-governmental  "foundation  for competition"  whose role is primarily  educational
initially;  in time, it could serve as an ombudsman.
Conduct Comprehensive  Empirical Assessment of Horizontal and Vertical Structures. The
task of de-monopolization  or dis-integration  in the industrial  sector is a complex one and should be part
of the medium  term agenda.  A prerequisite  for any proactive  competitive  restructuring  is comprehensive
empirical investigation  examining current horizontal and vertical concentration in  key product and
geographic  markets.  Efforts here can build on existing Goskomstat  data. The investigation  should assess
the competitive  impact  of emerging  economic  agglomerates,  including  FIGs, in priority  sectors.
Policies  to Foster  New Entry
Implement  Rules-Based  Streamlined  Business  Licensing at the Federal  and Local Levels. In
January 1998 new initiatives were discussed at a Government meeting on the problems of SMEs,
including  changes  in issuing of licenses.  But the measures  do not address the problem  that the setting of
license fees is subject to the discretion of local authorities,  which results in price discrimination  and
11arbitrary rule. Reformns  here are a top priority. They should be based on other countries'  experiences and
on enacting legislation that sets precise,  streamlined limits at all levels of government on the time and
money required to get a business  license in most sectors, and  codifies  sizeable criminal sanctions for
officials who violate this rules-based system. For certain sectors, such as human health, the environment
and  national  security, more  stringent  procedures  could be  applied. (See  the  Appendix  for  Ukraine's
initiatives.)
Establish  Mechanisms  to Enforce  Private Property Rights  and  Foster  Dispute  Resolution.
Even when appropriate legislation exists, the courts are unable to enforce procedures and outcomes. It is
important to  strengthen the  legal/judicial  framework to allow for  secure property rights and adequate
contract enforcement.  The new bailiff service recently authorized by law (sudebnye pristavy) should be
established  immediately  and  given  the  authority  to  enforce  automatically  compliance  by  losing
defendants.
Privatize  Warehousing  and  Distribution  Networks  and  Permit  De  Novo  Entry.  While  the
private sector has developed in the commercial and retail sectors, the state still plays the major role in the
wholesale  market  for  distribution  of  inputs  and  outputs; yet  competition  in distribution  networks  is
critical to reducing regional market segmentation. Competitive private ownership, through privatization
and  new  entry,  should be  permitted  at  the  federal  and  local  levels  in warehousing  and  wholesale
distribution activities as a priority measure. Existing franchise prohibitions or privatization limitations on
all but truly "strategic" distribution/warehousing  entities involving state federal and municipal property
should be repealed by law.
Combating  Corruption.  Many  countries  have  paid  increasing  attention  to  the  problem  of
corruption, and the debate on possible policy options is on-going. There is no single solution." 5 Recent
insights suggest that corruption arises when institutions have monopoly positions, there is the ability to
exercise discretion and incentives for accountability are weak. Additional laws themselves are unlikely to
bring about significant reduction in corruption. Effective reform must be directed to changing the system:
(i) introduction of independent oversight of agencies; (ii) clarifying and  making transparent  how much
official  discretion  can  be  exercised;  and  (iii)  utilizing  penalties  and  rewards  for  conduct.  Russian
authorities should give consideration to establishing independent anti-corruption  oversight ("watchdog")
bodies at the federal and regional levels; models can be found in other countries, such as Hong Kong,
Singapore, Botswana, Chile and Malaysia.
Rationalize  the Tax Regime.  Business taxes can be simplified through the draft Tax Code: (i)
reducing the number of taxes and (ii) making tax rules more transparent and less ambiguous. Stability of
taxes  can be  enhanced  through:  (iii)  keeping  changes to  a  minimum  and  when  there  are changes,
grandfathering existing  investments for a fixed period,  and (iv) prohibiting  retroactive  applications of
laws and regulations. These changes will help reduce discretion and intervention by local tax officials.
Confidentiality of taxpayer  information  can be ensured through (v)  legislation  that  specifies criminal
sanctions for official breaches.
Liberalize  Ownership  and Access  to Land  and Real Estate. The Government should renew its
commitment to  work with  the  Duma to  ensure  passage of  a comprehensive  Land  Code for the  free
transfer, ownership  and user rights of land. The Government  should also  accelerate current efforts to
create a  state system  for registering  real  estate rights  and transactions  as well  as creating  a  base of
standards for a system by which to ensure rights of ownership of real estate, including the institution of
title guarantees and insurance. An assessment of the land tax system should be completed with a view to
12removing disincentives on  the  part of local  governments  to sell  land under  privatized  non-land  real
estate.
Continue Liberalization  of the Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Regime.  While much  of
Russia's  trade regime is basically liberal, with average statutory tariff rates below 15%, more progress is
needed on liberalizing licensing and other non-tariff barriers on imported goods and services. Early WTO
accession, particularly  in the trade-in-services  area (GATS),  could help  to  introduce  "within  border"
competition  in the  distribution  sector.  The  Government  should  continue  to  bring  the  policy  regime
governing FDI  in line with international best  practice: (i) national treatment for foreign  investors; (ii)
binding international arbitration for investor-State disputes; (iii) substantial reduction in restricted sectors
and limitations on FDI in other sectors; (iv) freedom for profit remittances; (v) expropriation only for a
bona fide public purpose  and with prompt,  adequate compensation; and (vi)  and an absence  of trade-
related-investment-measures (TRIMs).'6
Promotional  Policies  for  SMEs.  Introducing  a  system  of  targeted  SME  support  through
subsidized lines of credit,  is likely to  be counterproductive.  Such a  regime undermines  market-based
reforms of the banking sector  and the  strengthening  of the  commercial  intermediation role of banks.
Worse, particularly in the context of a weak property rights, it breeds corruption. Support programs that
can be helpful  include (i) providing  equity participation  in venture  capital and  investment funds; (ii)
funding of local banks providing  commercial  based  credit to  SMEs; and  (iii) co-financing  with local
banks  of  SME  projects.  A  (iv)  government-sponsored  "one-stop-shop"  information  network  and
clearinghouse of market opportunities and relevant regulations  and legislation for  SMEs also could be
created on a local basis and coordinated at the federal level to ensure consistency nationwide.
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Table 1: Financial Performance of Firms by Size
(as % of sales revenue)
Large  Medium/Small
Number  of Firms  399  401
Employment  489,505  129,620
Avg. No.Employees  1,227  323
Sales revenue  Rb 31,046  mill  Rb 8,844 mill
1.  Net  income  before  tax  -1.1  1.3
2. Cash  flow  2.7  3.2
3. Net cash  flow  -0.8  0.4
Source: Goskomstat  database,  1996
Table 2:  Barriers to Business Operations in Russia
percEnta  e of surveyed  firms)
Barrier  Very  Serious  Somewhat  Serious  Not Very Serious  None
Regulation  (non-taxes)  9.1  27.4  59.8  3.7
Litigation  28.0  34.8  17.7  19.5
Financing  9.5  14.3  65.5  10.7
Criminal  Organizations  33.8  1.  013.
Source: World  Bank-Russian  Academy  of Sciences  survey  of 328 firms, 1997
Table 3: Taxes and Business Fees in Russia
National  Level  Local Level
Profits  tax  Tax on maintenance  of housing  and amenities
Individual  income  tax  Advertising  tax
VAT  Land  tax
Contributions  to Pension  Fund, Social  Insurance  Fund, Medical  Ground  rent tax
Insurance  Fund,  Employment  Fund  Computer  resale  tax
Highway  users  tax  Vehicle  resale  tax
Acquisition  tax on motor  vehicles  License  fee for holding  auctions
Fuel  and lab materials  tax  User fee for use of local symbols
User  fee for the use of words  "Russia"  and "Russian  Federation"  Levies  on stock exchange  transactions
Charges  for currency  sale transactions
Oblast  / Republic  Level  Charges  for cleaning  of human  settlements
Business  property  tax  Vehicle  parking  fees
Fees for educational  institutions  Police  service  taxes
Transportation  tax  Levies  on the right  to trade
Water  charges  Liquor  distribution  license  fees
Source:  The Russia  New Business  Development  Project,  Deloitte Touche  Tohmatsu  International,  June 1997
14Box 1: Kiev Lessens  Red Tape of Registration
In February  1998,  Ukraine enacted  a law streamlining  the registration  and licensing  process for businesses
to drastically  reduce  the time and money  required  to get a business  running. Foreign investors  have  long complained
that Ukraine's  labyrinthine  licensing  requirements  were a major deterrent  to investment  and development  of small-
and medium-size  business. Under  the new law,  the licensing  process  is to take no more  than five days  for most types
of businesses  to obtain  seven  basic licenses. Previously,  new firms had to get more  than 90 licenses  for about 1,000
types of business  activities. This  took at least several  months  and required  visits to more  than 30 ministries  and up to
800 municipal  bodies.  Senior Government  officials concede the previous process presented opportunities  for
authorities  to demand  bribes for each document  Under  the new law, limits will continue  only for businesses  that
have to do with  "human health,  the environment  and national security." Businesses  subject  to stricter  permits  are in
the mining,  arms, pharmaceuticals,  tobacco, alcohol, gambling,  legal, auditing,  insurance,  medical,  transportation,
education,  tourism  and  telecommunications  sectors.
Source: Moscow  Times,  February  4, 1998
15ENDNOTES
I  The focus  of this paper is Russia's  manufacturing  sector; it does not address  the infrastructure  monopolies
(what  the Russian  authorities  refer  to as the "natural  monopolies").  This article  draws from  H.G. Broadman,  1999a.
2  See H. G. Broadman, 1998. As of January 1998 more than 130,000  enterprises  had been privatized  in
Russia  since 1992. There  are approximately  29,000 federally-owned  enterprises  and institutions,  of a total of 88,000
state owned  enterprises  nationwide.
3  See,  for example,  H. G. Broadman,  1995,  1996,  and 1999b,  and World  Bank 1997a.
4  In addition,  barriers to exit through the bankruptcy  process remain high (see Mirsky, 1999); corporate
governance  structures  and incentives  diverge from market  principles (see Broadman,  in press); and a substantial
portion of transactions  is carried out through barter and non-monetary  instruments (see Hendley, Ickes and
Ryterman,  1999).
5  See,  for example,  P. Joskow,  R. Schmalansee,  and  N. Tsukanova,  1994.
6  Analysis  of these data was carried  out by the author  and James  Anderson.
7  See  A. Brown  and J. Brown,  1998.
8  These  problems  are exacerbated  by transport  considerations.  The opportunity  cost of transportation  was not
considered  in enterprise  location decisions  during the Soviet era. Site choices were made on the assumption  that
government  would  subsidize  the transportation  sector. The resultant  strain of that legacy  today is exacerbated  by the
fact that over  90 percent of domestic  Russian  freight  is transported  by rail (compared  with 50 percent in the US and
30 percent in Western  Europe).  This is only  partly a result of the country's large size: many  freight shipments  cover
only a short  distance.  The condition  and coverage  of the road system  remain  exceedingly  poor. Trucks  are used only
for intra-city  freight. This means that if fimns  wish to change suppliers or customers,  they must find alternate
shipping  arrangements.
9  See T. Frye and A. Shliefer,  1996;  and  World  Bank 1997b.
10  See  E. Perrotti  and T. Gelfer,  1998.
11  in  most transition  economies  in the region, including  Russia,  there is a clear downward  trend in budgetary
subsidies;  in 1996  these averaged  about 1% of GDP for EE/FSU  countries.  In the WB-RAS  survey,  9% of the firms
indicated  they received direct subsidies;  23% indicated  they receive  tax exemptions  or tax holidays.  As budgetary
subsidies have been eliminated,  tax arrears and inter-enterprise  arrears in some EE/FSU countries have risen
dramatically.  In Russia, tax arrears in  1997 were more than 10% of GDP. The Govemment is attempting to
accelerate  and expand  its efforts  to collect delinquent  tax payments--including  interest and penalties--from  large  tax
debtors. These actions  need  to be implemented  not only  at the federal  but also  the regional  levels.
12  See  Gomulka  1997.
13  See  B. Slay  1998.
14  Several east European and Baltic countries have been developing competition  policy and institutions
broadly  consistent  with EU guidelines  in these areas. In 1997 Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia and Romania  adopted new
competition  laws or new administrative  structures  in line with EU standards.  There have also been signs of active
enforcement  of competition  legislation  in the Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland, Slovenia  and the Baltic countries  on
terms of case reviews,  recommendations  and fines, although  few significant  actions to limit  the exercise of market
power  have  been  taken.
15  See R. Klitgaard,  1998;  and C. Gray  and D. Kaufmnann,  1998.
16  For recent  analysis  of Russian  trade and FDI  policy  and suggestions  for reform,  see Broadman  1999c.
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